Population Studies and Training Center

How Fixing One Workplace Problem Can Unleash Hidden Hiring Bias

New research by economist Elisa Macchi reveals how market frictions mask gender discrimination—and why piecemeal labor reforms can backfire.

Elisa Macchi’s 2026 paper, Hidden Discrimination in Frictional Labor Markets, co-authored with economist Claude Raisaro of the Geneva Graduate Institute, fundamentally reshapes how economists and policymakers understand gender-based hiring biases in developing economies. While standard labor theories posit that market frictions allow prejudice to persist or generate statistical discrimination, Macchi and Raisaro uncover a crucial third channel: frictions expand the set of non-technical worker attributes that employers value, which can actively mask underlying discrimination.

Female labor force participation in Uganda is relatively high, as is common in sub-Saharan Africa, yet most sectors remain nearly single-gendered. To isolate how the friction environment shapes the demand for female workers, Macchi and Raisaro designed a highly controlled, incentivized hiring experiment involving 921 employers across three male-dominated manufacturing sectors in Uganda. A major historical challenge in measuring demand-side discrimination is that supply constraints—often driven by social norms, safety, or transport issues—limit the pool of female applicants. Macchi and Raisaro circumvented this by keeping the labor supply fixed and offering employers the opportunity to hire from a more gender balanced pool of vocational trainees. 

The core of the experiment divided these 921 employers into three groups. One-third of the employers operated under business-as-usual conditions to establish a baseline. The remaining two-thirds received one of two randomized monitoring support technologies targeting either worker misbehavior or workplace safety. To complement this, they also conducted a lab-in-the-field experiment with vocation trainees to measure the accuracy of the employers' beliefs regarding worker performance, in terms of technical skills and trustworthiness.

Under business-as-usual conditions, Macchi and Raisaro found that employers exhibited a 10-percentage-point hiring preference for men. However, women possessed a hidden offsetting advantage—employers perceived them as inherently more trustworthy, making them highly valuable when theft was a major concern. When the behavior audits independently reduced the risk of worker theft, the hiring gender gap widened by 58%. Because employers no longer needed to rely on women’s perceived trustworthiness, the relative demand for women versus men decreased and the extent of discrimination against women increased. Conversely, when safety audits were introduced to address harassment and integration frictions, the relative demand for women increased and the gender gap completely disappeared. Thus, identity-neutral changes in the production environment had markedly gendered implications in terms of hiring disparities, by changing the demand for skills.

Macchi’s research challenges the foundational methodologies used to measure labor market bias that assume if candidates have identical technical skills, any difference in hiring rates is strictly due to discrimination. Macchi and Raisaro prove that this framework is incomplete. If friction-relevant attributes—like trustworthiness or the social cost of workplace integration—are not measured and treated as productive traits, researchers will routinely understate or overstate the true level of discrimination. Future empirical research must account for how specific local market constraints dictate which non-technical attributes employers value before concluding the exact nature of market bias.

For policymakers, development organizations, and NGOs, Macchi’s and Raisaro’s findings serve as a critical, real-world warning regarding the economic "Theory of the Second Best." Their study provides empirical proof that when multiple market distortions coexist, solving just one friction can inadvertently worsen optimal resource allocation and exacerbate inequality. If a policy intervention successfully improves workplace monitoring or reduces employer risk without addressing underlying social biases, it may inadvertently strip marginalized workers of the specific non-technical advantages that currently keep them employable.

To genuinely promote diversity—such as increasing female labor force participation in high-return, male-dominated trades—future interventions cannot operate in silos. Policies designed to upgrade firm management, reduce principal-agent problems, or formalize hiring should be evaluated for potential discrimination implications and paired with interventions that solve integration frictions, such as anti-harassment frameworks or inclusive workplace safety audits.